The Council is a crucial intergovernmental institution of the European Union.
Introduction
The Council is at the centre of the decision-making process in the European Union The intergovernmentalist approach (Moravcsik 2002 (Moravcsik , 2008 argues that the indirect legitimacy conferred by member states is sufficient for the European Union, especially when it is coupled with output-oriented legitimising arguments. One assumption behind this reasoning, which seems to be particularly important, is that intergovernmental EU institutions function as undisturbed relays of positions established within national political systems. The positions are transferred (via instructions) to the EU level, where intergovernmental negotiations take place and agreement is reached. Thus, the accountability and legitimacy of EU decision-making can be traced back to the parliamentary accountability of governments and the democratic input legitimacy of national political systems.
However, many scholars, in particular constructivists, do not share such an understanding of the EU's political processes. Constructivist research on decision-making in EU institutions suggests that social processes which occur in intergovernmental EU institutions might disturb the relaying of positions described above (Aus 2010; Lewis 2010b; Juncos and Pomorska 2011) . This begs the question of how these disruptions affect the problem of legitimacy. In this regard, a normative inquiry regarding the democracy and legitimacy of the EU needs empirical research, to clarify the extent to which socialisation influences legitimacy intermediation, as well as the character of the disruptions it supposedly causes. Moreover, because of the apparent consensual quality of decision-making in the Council, it is important to inquire into the meaning of consensus in this regard and the ways it is reached.
The objective of this paper is to establish links between empirical research on socialisation and decision-making in the Council, and normative questions regarding democracy and legitimacy of governance at the EU level. In order to do so, the paper first outlines the characteristic features of decision-making in the Council, in particular its complexity, lack of transparency and the prevalence of consensus, despite an increasing scope of issues which could be decided by qualified majority. The third section then enquires into the role the Council plays in providing legitimacy to the EU, and the fourth describes the potential consequences of socialisation of national officials in the Council.
The remainder of the paper aims to answer two research questions by analysing empirical material generated in in-depth interviews: first, how can legitimacy intermediation through the Council be disrupted by normative and behavioural changes among socialised national officials? Second, does the process of reaching consensus in the Council help provide output legitimacy, or undermine it? The paper concludes by summarising the results and discussing them, which directs to further questions and avenues for research.
Decision-making process in the Council: complex, opaque, consensual
The decision-making process in the Council is highly complex; its features result from several factors -the three most important concern the structural characteristics of the Council and its engagement in shaping EU decisions. First, the Council deals with a wide variety of matters, which requires a horizontal division of labour, i.e. there are diverse bodies (or multiple individual configurations of a formally singular body) for different substantial policy areas. Second, the Council is a multi-layered structure composed of numerous organs: from working parties and committees up to ministerial configuration.
The former, called preparatory bodies, gather national officials of different ranks and act as filters to ensure that latter (the ministers who constitute the top layer, or the Council in the strict sense) only have to deal with issues that would not find a reasonable solution without their engagement (Häge 2008; Kirpsza 2011; Grøn and Salomonsen 2015) . Third, decisionmaking in the EU has become more complicated as a result of the developments of European integration: the European Parliament (EP) plays a more important role, the number of member states is growing, and so is the scope of EU policies. These changes have caused the Council to expand its informal procedures, and similar processes can be observed in interinstitutional relations (Fabbrini and Puetter 2016) .
Despite the complexity of its structure, functions and relations, the Council is a productive decision-maker; member states reach agreement by trading concessions, persuasion, finding compromise solutions to common problems, allowing for opt-outs or exceptions, or delegating details to the implementation phase (Warntjen 2017: 966-967) .
The relative importance of each of these (and other) approaches is debated in the literature.
Some authors distinguish several normative modes of negotiation, which differ in the extent of cooperative behaviour between the parties and might depend on substantive, issue-specific, or institutional structural factors (Warntjen 2010; Cross 2012). Others analyse variation among the actors, e.g. how much do they rely on argumentation, how generous do they tend to be, or with whom do they cooperate most often (Naurin 2009 (Naurin , 2015 Naurin and Lindahl 2010) .
One of the characteristics of the decision-making process in the Council which draws considerable attention is its lack of transparency. Despite pro-transparency reforms of the 1990s (Hillebrandt et al. 2014) the details of what takes place within the Council remain hidden from the public. The opacity is particularly pronounced in non-legislative issues, but manifests itself when the Council acts in its legislative capacity as well. In the latter case, transparency is reduced by a reliance on informal communication between the representatives of member states, and institutionalised, albeit informal, forums of either intra-or inter-institutional negotiation (e.g. Hillebrandt and Novak 2016; Reh et al. 2013) .
Much of the interest in transparency stems from the belief that it contributes to legitimacy, responsibility and accountability -or, more generally, from the idea that it is a constitutive part of democratic rule and good governance (Hillebrandt et al. 2014: 4-5) .
On the other hand, parties sceptical towards transparency invoke the need for a 'space to think' away from an audience (Hillebrandt and Novak 2016: 527-529) . They claim that without such space intergovernmental institutions would be unable to efficiently resolve issues facing the EU. In fact, some studies give credit to such notions, e.g. James Cross operating smoothly, they might prefer to avoid being blamed for obstructing the decisionmaking process, and also want to ensure that the decision will be implemented by all member states (Häge 2013: 485-486) . To achieve this goal, they could engage in reciprocal concessions, including vote trading on specific issues, as well as more diffuse forms of reciprocity. In effect, they would be 'insured' against decisions violating their core interests 
The Council and EU legitimacy
This paper builds on current research reviewed above, in particular taking into account consensus as a norm and practice within the complex structure of the Council. The focus in this section will turn to legitimacy. In short, legitimacy 'ensures voluntary compliance with unwelcome exercises of governing authority ' (Scharpf 2007: 3) . Because the Council is not directly elected or accountable to a European electorate, its legitimacy has to be derived 
Research questions and methods
Taking into account the prior research presented above, the rest of this paper attempts 
Socialisation, representation and consensus
As described above, socialisation affects individuals' behaviour as well as their properties (value judgements, roles, identities). My analysis confirms that in the case of from other countries press them, so that they can report to the capital that they were alone and would be outvoted.
One additional factor has to do with transparency, or rather the lack thereof. According to one the interviewees, transparency would undermine the ability of the EU to decide, because it would make representatives of the member states, the European Parliament, and others, less flexible with their positions ('individuals will hold their starting position more strongly (…) This will kill many decision-making processes' -Interview 1).
To summarise this part of the analysis, both positive and negative factors for legitimacy intermediation can be found in the practices of national officials in the Council. However, while they remain generally loyal to their governments, the strong norms against 'being the brakeman' make them less reliable as neutral intermediaries of national positions than the typical pro-indirect legitimacy argument assumes. They go beyond their instructions, reinterpret their mandate and even occasionally undermine the positions of their government in order to reach a reasonable solution, which they can 'sell' to their superiors, at the same time avoiding negative social consequences within the Council.
Significant portions of the interviews were devoted to the ways of reaching decision in the preparatory bodies of the Council, especially the extent to which they are consensual and how are they affected by qualified majority rule. One of the recurring notions was that there is a willingness within the Council to include particular needs of the member states, that there is an attitude of openness and 'a recognition of unique situations, understanding when someone has a problem [with particular proposal]' (Interview 6). In fact, 'when someone has a problem with a rigid position' (Interview 6), especially when it is known that 'something is very important to them' (Interview 9), others attempt to address their reservations, 'to meet them' (Interview 5). 
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In broader terms, interviewees referred to 'a spirit of compromise' in the Council (same phrase used in Interview 8 and Interview 10) and emphasised that 'you can always get along' (Interview 7). They also stated that the decision-making culture in the Council prohibits humiliating the minority ('there is no culture of humiliation' -Interview 2). It is important to ensure that 'no one is a loser' (Interview 1), so even if there is a qualified majority for a proposal, the presidency tries to 'meet the expectations of a minority' (Interview 9). In this environment, it is crucial whether there is an important, justified interest or problem behind a position or not ('It is crucial to present your own circumstances' -Interview 4) and whether it is properly explained: 'argumentation is important (…), there is a genuine discussion, an argument-based dispute' (Interview 6).
The argumentation 'is rather for than against' (Interview 2), which fits with the bias against opposing described above. The level of confrontation is low, manifest in the language used.
Multiple interviewees described how even the negative statements were always softened with some positive message at the beginning (similar descriptions present in: Interview 3; Interview 8; Interview 9; Interview 10).
It is interesting how the interviewees described decision-making under qualified majority voting rule. One said, 'it essentially is a consensus, but of a different kind, which demands more flexibility' (Interview 10). Another assured that, regardless of qualified majority threshold being achieved or not, the objective of negotiation is to 'reach consensus' or at least 'consensus minus one' (Interview 5). According to one of the interviewees, consensus is a legitimating instrument, which 'expresses the sovereignty of the member states' (Interview 3). On the other hand, another official claimed that both the secretariat and the presidency continuously monitor the (hypothetical) distribution of votes and focus their efforts on eliminating blocking minorities ('From the very beginning, the secretariat and the presidency calculate qualified majority and blocking minority' -Interview 1).
Moving towards the delegitimating facets of consensus, the primary problem, as described above, is whether consensus is in fact a genuine compromise or only a pretence.
One interviewee defined consensus as follows: 'consensus does not mean that everyone agrees, but they know what is the blocking minority threshold and will not be voting against in vain -instead they try to earn small concessions' (Interview 2). What follows is that some states might remain deeply dissatisfied with the compromise, but due to different pressures their representatives will not express the dissatisfaction, tacitly accepting 'consensual' decisions.
Another feature of the EU decision-making worth some attention in this context is the content of decisions. Interviewees said that consensus was often 'a rotten compromise', which stemmed from the effort to 'reach consensus by all means' (Interview 6). They claimed that the content of decisions was purposefully written 'ambiguously, with shades of grey' (Interview 4) -such 'European compromise is based on ambiguity which reconciles the parties' (Interview 7). One interviewee observed that this kind of compromise might be useless and cause problems with interpretation in the future (Interview 10). 
Conclusions
This article was an inquiry into the ways socialisation of national officials in the Council of the European Union could enhance or undermine the legitimacy of the decision-making process in which they take part. Its point of departure was establishing the complex, opaque and consensual character of the process. The exploratory analysis of interview material followed, meant to answer two main questions -one related to the potential disruption of input legitimacy intermediation through the Council, the other focused on whether consensual practices in the Council provide output legitimacy.
As the results show, there is no simple answer to either of these questions -there are diverse ways in which national officials adopt norms and adapt to behaviours expected of them. However, it is possible to distinguish some tendencies or more prevalent practices among socialised officials, evident from the empirical material analysed.
National officials remain loyal to their governments, but they tend to accept norms against objecting or presenting outlier positions. They reinterpret their instructions and attempt to reach solutions acceptable to both their capitals and their colleagues within the Council. This way, socialisation can be seen as disruptive to legitimacy intermediation through the Council.
There is no evidence for norms sustaining the domination of the strongest players in the Council. The normative environment supports the inclusion of justified requests made by national representatives, regardless of the share of votes at their disposal. Even though consensus is sometimes false, socialised behaviours and norms favour genuine compromise aimed at ensuring there are no big losers among the member states. Socialisation can thus be said to support the provision of output legitimacy to the decision-making process in the Council.
It is important to note that both sets of socialised norms and behaviours are interrelated. Genuine consensus depends on member state representatives' willingness to transcend their mandates and refrain from objecting, in favour of constructive input.
Coming back to Figure 1 , the scenario in the top right corner is what the empirical material analysed in this paper supports. However, this does not mean that each Council decision necessarily lacks input legitimacy or is well-legitimised on the output side. This article analysed the influence of socialisation and does not argue for an absence of other factors which work for or against the legitimacy of decision-making in the Council.
Currently, more effort is invested into reaching a more inclusive compromise in the Council than one would expect if it were to decide by qualified majority. If national parliaments get more involved and transparency is introduced, the practices of consensus might weaken, because the governments of the powerful member states would be obliged to vote against other states rather than reach a compromise solution. Such a development could either halt legislation or institute a system of domination by the strongest member states.
More research is needed in particular into the practice of consensus. While the puzzle of consensus in the Council has received considerable attention and a number of explanations, underpinned by various theoretical standpoints, none is clearly more 
